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ABSTRACT 
If  there is a substantial stake in the philosophical discussion about moral realism, then this concerns 
the viable answers to questions like the following: Does our concept of  reality allow for “stuff ” like 
goods, values or obligations which seem at first sight abstruse? Can room be made for a subset of  
“facts” united by the property of  somehow belonging to the (admittedly vague) field of  morality? Is 
there an accessible theoretical space wherein a form of  impersonal or at any rate non-special 
knowledge of  these facts can be developed? In the essay, I take a stand and argue for a variety of  
moral realism that is disconnected from any sense of  moral anxiety. Simply put, I assume not only 
that, as a rule, the quality of  a society’s moral life does not depend on the meta-ethics prevailing in 
the (notoriously thin) community of  moral philosophers, but that there are non-realist moral theories 
that, ideally, can be regarded as effective bulwarks against immorality or amorality. Nor I think that 
there is an a priori incompatibility between a realist stance in ethics and a non-panadaptationist view 
of  biological evolution, which does not purport to explain all that exists and matters in people’s lives 
exclusively in the light of  its reproductive fitness. As a result, I see the relevant dispute as revolving 
around the (comparatively) higher or lower plausibility of  the reconstruction of  the conditions of  
intelligibility of  moral experience, as it manifests itself  in the human life-form or, more modestly, in 
the societies or cultures inhabited by the philosophers contributing to the debate of  interest here. 
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Moral knowledge is not simply intellectual grasp of propositions; it is not 
even simply intellectual grasp of particular facts; it is perception. It is 
seeing a complex, concrete reality in a highly lucid and richly responsive 
way; it is taking in what is there, with imagination and feeling 
Martha C. Nussbaum 
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1. MORAL ANXIETIES 
If there is a substantial stake in the philosophical discussion about moral 
realism, then this concerns the viable answers to questions like the following: 
Does our concept of reality allow for “stuff” like goods, values or obligations 
which seem at first sight abstruse? Can room be made for a subset of “facts” 
united by the property of somehow belonging to the (admittedly vague) field of 
morality? Is there an accessible theoretical space wherein a form of impersonal or 
at any rate non-special knowledge of these facts can be developed? 
Questions of this kind may assume a dramatic tone and a more than 
theoretical significance if a positive answer is taken to be the inescapable 
condition for safeguarding something that is seen as essential in the human life-
form. In this case, acknowledging the existence of moral facts is understood as the 
necessary outcome of a transcendental argument, where a realist view of morality 
appears as the only consistent way of making sense of a true moral experience, 
whether the latter is conceived of in evaluative or in prescriptive terms. 
As I frame in broad terms my take on the issue of moral realism, I have in the 
back of my mind familiar stances such as: (1) anti-relativism (in the wide spectrum 
ranging from Dostoyevsky’s to Diego Marconi’s or Roberta De Monticelli’s),1 
where giving up objectivity is sensed as a kind of surrender to the view that, as 
long as value judgments are concerned, “anything goes”; or: (2) anti-materialism, 
where an idea of nature in which no room is left for something that does not fit 
with the scientific worldview is fiercely disputed (as in, for example, Thomas 
Nagel’s Mind and Cosmos). 
In what follows, I want to take a stand and argue for a variety of moral realism 
that is disconnected from this sense of urge. Simply put, I assume not only that, as 
a rule, the quality of a society’s moral life does not depend on the meta-ethics 
prevailing in the (notoriously thin) community of moral philosophers, but that 
there are non-realist moral theories that, ideally, can be regarded as effective 
bulwarks against immorality or amorality. (What I am gesturing at here is that I 
am unable to see any logical fallacy in, for example, a constructivist theory of 
 
1 Cf. D. Marconi, Per la verità. Relativismo e filosofia, Einaudi, Torino, 2007; R. De Monticelli, 
La questione morale, Cortina, Milano, 2010. 
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human rights.) Nor I think that there is an a priori incompatibility between a 
realist stance in ethics and a non-panadaptationist view of biological evolution, 
which does not purport to explain all that exists and matters in people’s lives 
exclusively in the light of its reproductive fitness.2 As a result, I understand the 
relevant dispute as revolving around the (comparatively higher or lower) 
plausibility of the reconstruction of the conditions of intelligibility of moral 
experience, as it manifests itself in the human life-form (if something like this 
exists) or, more modestly, in the societies or cultures populated by the 
philosophers contributing to the debate of interest here. 
If my way of framing the issue succeeds, it will lead to a quietist conclusion in 
two different senses. On the one hand, because its goal goes no further than 
showing the relative superiority of a realist account of moral experience by 
capitalizing on a style of reasoning which, while retaining the form of a 
transcendental (or abductive) argument, gives up any inescapability claim as to its 
conclusions and content itself with making plausible a prima facie baffling claim, 
i.e. that strange things such as moral “properties” are part of the furniture of the 
world. On the other hand, turning an unfathomable enigma into an ordinary fact 
should have the side effect of dissolving the anxieties that have been piling up 
around the alleged “queerness” or Sonderstellung of the human form of life in the 
physical world during the last centuries. Such anxieties account for, among other 
things, the disproportionate role played by the naturalistic fallacy argument in 
modern ethical discussion. If I had to resort to a slogan to sum up my aims in this 
essay, I could say that I would be glad to expand the philosophically beneficial 
effects of deconstructing the “myth of the given” to the ethical field. 
2. IN SEARCH OF REALITY 
The semantic density and the historical stratification of the concept of “reality” 
(as well as of “fact” or, for what it is worth, “objectivity”) is what makes the 
controversies on moral realism unpalatable to those who have managed to retain 
a residual theoretical naiveté and a tad of detachment from philosophical 
encyclopaedism. It is actually unclear how this kind of complexity can be handled 
without paying an excessive price in terms of ambiguity and vagueness. (In many 
 
2 For an excellent exploration of the theoretical limits of “Darwinism in its current scientific 
incarnation,” see D.J. Depew, B. Weber, “The Fate of Darwinism: Evolution after the Modern 
Synthesis,” Biological Theory, 6, 2011, pp. 89-102. 
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regards, it cannot even be taken for granted that the concept of reality is a 
coherent concept.) Yet, one has to make as explicit as possible the tacit 
background of this worn-out notion and try to turn the familiar into something 
questionable, lest one loses the grip on the whole issue. Provided that moral 
realists wish to make room in the ordinary understanding of reality for the idea 
that ethics is a phenomenon in its own right, there has to be some form of 
agreement on the use one wants to make of a term that has neither rigid reference 
nor an uncontested sense. 
I begin with this caveat because my main aim here is to understand whether 
the current philosophical discussion is open to a view that I see as heavily 
underrepresented. This view is firmly positioned in the realist camp – if by moral 
realism we mean an outlook that rejects the intellectually sophisticated idea that 
morality is a purely human construct, more precisely an expression of the human 
will – although its followers shy away from interpreting “real” as an epistemic 
property, i.e. as the content of a justified true belief.3 For this variety of moral 
realism, in other words, it is enough to figure out compelling reasons to hold the 
common-sense belief that moral experience makes somehow “contact” with what 
is out there and, consequently, that the resistance felt by most people to getting 
rid of any moral scruple does not result from a mere psychological conditioning. 
Even in the unlikely event that a universal agreement could be reached about this, 
the consensus would not exempt us from a truly open debate on another no less 
evident aspect of moral life. I am thinking here of the cognitive 
underdetermination of every moral doctrine and the considerable diversity of 
opinions regarding goods, values and duties within the human community. This 
is no surprising realization for those who, like myself, see knowledge, i.e. the 
endeavour to deliver justified beliefs about the world, as a power that is by its very 
nature more de-realizing than functional to strengthening our contact with reality. 
I shall return to this at greater length below. 
Seen in this light, it is not surprising that adhering to a form of moral realism 
should not necessarily lead to the controversial claim that a universal cognitive 
convergence based on the access to the objective truth of ethical bastions (whether 
value judgments or prescriptions) is a reachable target even if only in the long 
 
3 As far as I can see, my take on the maddeningly difficult issue of the difference between 
“reality” and “existence” is largely Kantian. For a useful résumé on the topic, see W. Schwarz, 
“Kant’s Categories of Reality and Existence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2, 1987, 
pp. 343-346, especially p. 346: “Reality is always given, but existence is problema”. 
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run. The hypothesis that I would like to test, rather, is whether there is something 
in the very nature of moral “realities” that makes such an outcome highly 
unlikely. Mine is the burden of not so much demonstrating – this would be a task 
beyond my strength – as to gesture at a plausible account of moral experience 
that, in light of what we know about our species and the physical world in which 
we live, should make sense of the mediated influence exerted by stubborn moral 
facts upon the deliberations and conducts of moral agents. 
To cut a long story short, in the view I am advocating here, the sense of reality 
precedes its representation. It is, in other words, a natural response to our 
engagement with things and agents whose behaviour is independent of our will 
and desire. What’s more, a consistent concept of reality as it is in itself is premised 
in the representationalist outlook on the possibility of having access to a “view 
from nowhere”, which, however, can only be the product of a counterfactual 
abstraction with a regulative function in the ordinary cognitive performances. 
The latter, in fact, are never contingent on a frontal relationship with the totality 
of experience.4 Reality as such, to sum up, cannot be an object. It is better 
conceived of as an environment, a tacit background, or an exploratory field. 
This, at any rate, does not mean denying that there is a mutual influence 
between the sense of reality and the various cognitive deeds that capitalize on that 
original contact with what is out there. Anyone who has read without bias the 
engaging fifth chapter of Mind and Cosmos knows what I am talking about.5 In 
those pages, rowing against the current, Nagel challenges the plausibility of a neo-
Darwinian view of the evolution of life and cosmos starting from an overriding 
insight on the reality of values, or better on the self-evidence of the realm of 
morality as the quintessence of what is real in people’s lives. 
Value judgments and moral reasoning are part of human life, and therefore part of 
the factual evidence about what humans are capable of. The interpretation of 
faculties such as these is inescapably relevant to the task of discovering the best 
scientific or cosmological account of what we are and how we came into existence. 
What counts as a good explanation depends heavily on an understanding of what it 
is that has to be explained.6 
 
4 On this point see J. McDowell, Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World, in 
Id., Mind, Value, & Reality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1998, pp. 112-130, 
especially pp. 118-122. 
5 T. Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is 
Almost Certainly False, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 
6 Ibid., p. 106. 
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The daring conclusion reached by Nagel reverses the influential argument 
offered by Sharon Street: “since moral realism is true, a Darwinian account of the 
motives underlying moral judgment must be false, in spite of the scientific 
consensus in its favor.”7 
Like John Dupré,8 I too have the impression that Nagel’s conclusion is hasty. It 
seems motivated less by a distrust in Darwin’s ability in accounting for life’s unity 
in diversity than by his impatience with a number of controversial philosophical 
extrapolations about the impact of the Darwinian revolution on some 
metaphysical imaginaries inherited by our intellectual tradition. This, however, 
does not undermine the force of the argumentative strategy adopted by Nagel. As 
far as I can see, it starts from a questionable, but non-negligible consideration. I 
would sum it up as follows. A substantial portion of the Homo sapiens species 
members systematically show that they possess a special kind of receptivity – 
answerability to moral norms – that puts them in a condition to distance 
themselves from self-indulgent inclinations and recognize their reasons for acting 
otherwise. Familiarity with values, therefore, does not arise from a 
representational, head-on stance towards the world that would lead to the 
discovery of a subset of sui generis facts (the domain of value). It is, rather, a 
recognition of a basic feature of our life-form, that, to quote an eloquent statement 
by Ronald Dworkin, “is self-contained and self-certifying.”9 In this regard, values 
are “as real as trees or pain.”10 
The intuition is clear. But what notion or image of reality is compatible with 
this view of the natural attunement of human beings with “irreducibly normative 
facts or truths,”11 which, however robust, seem to lose consistency outside their 
(non-contingent) embedding in the life of imaginative agents such as ourselves? 
3. A SENSE FOR REALITY 
 
7 Ibid., p. 105; cf. S. Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical 
Studies, 1, 2006, pp. 109-166. 
8 J. Dupré, “Review of Mind and Cosmos,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 29 October 
2012, available at: https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/35163-mind-and-cosmos-why-the-materialist-neo-
darwinian-conception-of-nature-is-almost-certainly-false/. 
9 See R. Dworkin, Religion without God, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2013, p. 
16. 
10 Ibid., p. 13. 
11 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, p. 106. 
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In order to answer this question, some general remarks on realism are in 
order.12 By it I mean, in a broad sense, the claim that we have sufficient reasons to 
believe that there is a world out there that is not reducible to the thoughts 
(concepts, images, beliefs) that have it as their reference or content. But where do 
these reasons come from? If I am not mistaken, they do not issue from 
particularly convincing justifications – which, the more refined they are, the more 
they appear vulnerable to sceptical doubts – but from the invitation to re-awaken 
a familiarity with reality that dwells in our less remarkable relations with the 
world and which, precisely because it lacks any drama, tends to go unnoticed. 
After all, what does it mean to be born, to exist, if not to be immersed in 
reality, to be in contact with it? The very concept of reality (with the correlative 
distinction between it and appearance or delusion) presupposes a basic sense of 
reality which is not the product of a head-on view of the whole that can aspire to 
be included into the realm of objectivity. In its original meaning, reality can be 
likened to an atmosphere, a medium with which we are in contact on each side 
(and in this sense, neither subjective nor objective)13 – something that is never 
noticed: the “familiar” par excellence. Preceding even the distinction between 
inside and outside, it can be likened to the air for terrestrial animals or water for 
aquatic ones.14 What is familiar or well-known (bekannt), however, cannot become 
explicitly known (erkannt) without undergoing a radical metamorphosis.15 In 
point of fact, we do not entertain an epistemic relation stricto sensu with it. The 
reality, as such, is not amenable to justification: it is what it is. Nonetheless, an 
unproblematic contact with it is the precondition so that our cognitive relation 
with the various portions of the world that are delimited and thematically focused 
on does not spin frictionless.16 
 
12 For what follows see my “Realism, Relativism, and Pluralism: An Impossible Marriage?,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 4-5, 2015, pp. 413-422, from which I borrowed a few paragraphs. 
13 On this topos see J. Habermas, Von den Weltbildern zur Lebenswelt, in Id., 
Nachmetaphysisches Denken II: Aufsätze und Repliken, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 2012, pp. 19-
53, especially pp. 20-21. 
14 For an intelligent use of this image as food for thought about the risks of humans’ “natural, 
basic self-centeredness”, see D.F. Wallace, This is Water, Little, Brown, & Company, New York, 
2009, p. 37. 
15 On this point see my ‘“What is Familiar is not Understood Precisely Because It is Familiar’: A 
Re-Examination of J. McDowell’s Quietism,” Verifiche, 1-3, 2012, pp. 103-127. 
16 For a persuasive re-articulation of phenomenological realism see H. Dreyfus, C. Taylor, 
Retrieving Realism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2015. 
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We could describe this sense of reality as an antisolipsistic or 
antiphenomenalist bulwark: it is the pre-thematic certainty that one does not have 
to do only with oneself or, in Bernard Williams’ words, that in the pursuit of truth, 
“the struggle is with something other than oneself.”17 Compared to this otherness 
which refuses to give in, the feeling of frustration that can be felt is very real. For 
it is not akin to a titanic revolt against something logically impossible (for 
example, that 2 + 2 = 5 or the desire to “be monogamously married to each of 
four women at once”),18 but rather stems from the observation that a painful 
“conceivable alternative” is foreclosed to us for contingent reasons: because this is 
how the world is. A painful truth that we have somehow to come to terms with. 
As I noted above, this basic sense of reality is usually dormant: it does not play 
a big role in the daily life of creatures like us who, like any other animal, are 
generally saturated (i.e. continually at grips) with the world around them. It is 
rather the unsaturability of our cognitive relationship with the world and the 
infinite extensibility of the connections between reasons that has a de-realizing 
impact on the epistemic subject. Perhaps, the example that best captures this loss 
of contact is the attempt to understand the cause-effect relationships apart from 
the agent’s acquaintance with the incessant causal impingement of the 
environment through her own lived body. If (as it happens with special force in 
the modern age) this is amplified by a social environment that encourages people 
to take an objectifying stance towards the life-world, the feeling of being naturally 
in contact with a reality that does not depend on our ability to represent it or 
justify it can be severely undermined. 
It must be emphasized, however, that a defence of realism along this line is 
compatible with a highly revisionist attitude towards the different regional 
ontologies. Indeed, once the exaggerated fear lest there may be a total disconnect 
between us and reality is exorcised, it is only natural to expect that the specific 
queries about the “consistency” of more or less complex theoretical constructs 
(atoms, biological species, society, love, the past, and so forth), about whose 
existence we are committed in our scientific or folk understanding of the world, 
lose much of their drama. 
Hopefully, rephrasing the issue of our basic sense of reality in terms of the 
traditional problem of free will can be helpful. Metaphysically speaking, in the 
 
17 B. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton (NJ), 2002, p. 145. 
18 Ibid., p. 139. 
95       Realism without Objectivity 
 
 
 
view sketched above, we are indeed free, but only situatedly free. To switch from 
an absolute (“negative”) to a situated (“positive”) understanding of freedom also 
means to relieve the anxiety that always goes together with the feeling of being 
released from any external, non-self-imposed constraint. Williams argued this 
point convincingly: “To be free, in the most basic, traditional, intelligible sense, is 
not to be subject of another’s will. It does not consist of being free from all 
obstacles. On the contrary, freedom has any value only if there is something you 
want to do, and if, moreover, the want you have is not one that you can change at 
will for another want. A central form of freedom, then, is not to be subject to 
another’s will in working toward something that you find worthwhile.”19 
Human knowledge, precisely because it cannot operate apart from a practice of 
justification by reasons, has the appearance, prima facie, of a self-sufficient system 
of ideal relations. As John McDowell has claimed with good arguments in his 
instructive debate with Hubert Dreyfus,20 imagining an “external” to the 
conceptual makes no sense once access is granted to the noetic realm. This is the 
portion of truth to be found in the coherentist theories of epistemic justification. 
However, this aspect of human rationality, while exposing each exercise of 
justification by reasons to the risk of unsaturability and rendering every theory 
partially undetermined, does not affect the basic sense of reality characteristic of 
any living being, which can always be reactivated at least obliquely (that is, with a 
noluntas gesture rather than with an authoritative act of will). 
Let me illustrate this point with some examples. I may have to work hard to 
warrant my belief that the creature that devoured my sheep can be correctly 
identified as a member of the species canis lupus, but the fact remains that my 
desire that the sheep be still alive will be inevitably frustrated. I may entertain 
many reasonable doubts about the ontological consistency of money, about its 
delusional, if not “religious” nature, but that will not dissolve my worries about 
the state of my bank account, whose effects on my behaviour and my decisions 
will reactivate my natural sense of reality. Drawing attention to the power of 
reflectivity to undermine any claim to settle in a permanent centre of gravity does 
not mean to ignore the fact that such ex-centricity supervenes on the animal 
condition of spatio-temporally situated individuals, who are constantly at grips 
 
19 Ibid., p. 145. 
20 See the exchange published in Inquiry, 4, 2007, pp. 338-377 and the later collection of essays 
edited by J.K. Schear, Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, 
Routledge, London, 2013. 
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with the world and whose experience is full of ordinary hackneyed truths.21 After 
all, the endless search for the right distance, which characterizes the human effort 
to feel at home in the world, is built on this structural tension. 
4. RESISTANCE: THE STUBBORNNESS OF MORAL FACT 
Who wants to sidestep the zero-sum game of the controversy between realists 
and anti-realists ought to be aware of these different, but not mutually exclusive, 
levels of our relationship with the real. This does not mean ignoring the fact that, 
by dint of exercising the capacity to distance oneself from the world and put it 
into perspective, and then reflectively distance oneself from one’s own point of 
view as well (and so forth), the impression can easily settle in that the dichotomy 
between external and internal, subjective and objective, mental and physical, 
constitutes the zero or “absolute” degree of being a minded self, with respect to 
which the reliability of our sense of reality should be measured or checked.22 
If we should obsessively ask ourselves about everything that we experience 
whether it is subjective or objective, internal or external, dependent or 
independent from our representations or mental patterns, the sense that the 
world is something irretrievably lost – a ghost lingering on the ruins of our 
philosophical systems – would become almost inescapable.23 And we would 
rejoice or complain depending on the different circumstances, temperaments or 
historical periods. As a matter of fact, though, what would be lost is not exactly 
the world, but a pictorial or photographic picture of the world, with respect to 
which only a detached observer could actually enjoy an abysmal freedom and the 
moral subject experience the sense of an infinite responsibility. 
 
21 As Karsten Harries observed about Cusanus’s principle of “learned ignorance”: the 
contingent human “center does not bind reflection. And the same can be said of the body that 
places us on this earth, assigns us terrestrials our point of view and provides us with a natural 
measuring rod”; see K. Harries, Origins of the Modern World Picture: Cusanus and Alberti. 
Seminar Notes, Princeton, 2013, p. 48, available at: 
https://campuspress.yale.edu/karstenharries/files/2012/09/Origins-of-the-Modern-World-Picture.-
Cusanus-and-Alberti2-1abyk3t.pdf. 
22 On this point see B. Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1978, pp. 64-66. About the reasonable disagreement (which is generally 
articulated in a first order dissent and some form of second order consent) as a “variable-sum 
game”, cf. I. Testa, “I giardini culturali del relativismo,” L’ospite ingrato, 1, 2008, pp. 59-72, in 
particular pp. 69-70. 
23 See R. Rorty, “The World Well Lost,” The Journal of Philosophy, 19, 1972, pp. 649-665.  
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Freedom and responsibility: this coupling sounds all too familiar. What could 
be more ordinary for us than a subject who is willing to make any sacrifice in 
order to affirm freedom of choice or self-determination? Yet, on closer inspection, 
changing the world into an image – and the parallel relativization of one’s own 
viewpoint – is anything but an ordinary mental performance. It is not something 
that the individual can accomplish in total autonomy or spontaneity. It 
presupposes, among other things, a remarkable intellectualization and 
objectification of experience, for example through writing and embedding the 
thought-products in material supports that are maximally resistant to the 
corrosive power of time.24 
The philosophically most interesting and problematic step, however, is the 
meta-theoretical move that led to the segregation of the realm of spontaneity and 
agency within a non-natural space on account of their intangibility and their not 
being spatio-temporally located. Which, in turn, meant denying them any reality 
and causal efficacy. From this familiar standpoint, the suspension looks sensible 
and it may seem obvious that “moral facts” should take on the semblance of 
fabulous creatures, true metaphysical chimeras. Indeed, how can something both 
be a “fact” and belong to an ontological region where the properties of inertiality, 
stubbornness and resistance to the will are denied the pride of place? 
This is notoriously the most troubling issue for the advocates of moral realism. 
An advantage, though, resulting from the quietist argument above is the 
weakening of the strictly epistemic question of whether a necessary condition for 
ascribing reality to something with which one makes experientially contact should 
be its total independence from the subject’s spontaneous agency. Since it precedes 
the fracture between subject and object, our sense of reality is untouched by this 
derivative doubt. 
The point lies elsewhere: how can one envisage a form of contact with non-
material realities such as values in which a variety of non-metaphorical resistance 
is experienced? If a personal commitment is the condition for a moral fact to 
constrain my behaviour and this supposes a voluntary recognition of its 
normative cogency, is not the denial of assent sufficient to make these alleged 
facts of life disappear from view? But, this being the case, how can one 
 
24 I tried to read the modern philosophical trajectory leading to the loss of the world against a 
Grand Narrative in “Quanto è moderno il relativismo? Il mondo messo in prospettiva e le svolte 
assiali dell’umanità,” Filosofia e teologia, 1, 2014, pp. 22-36. 
98        PAOLO COSTA 
 
legitimately claim the reality of such volatile things? What distinguishes them 
from fantasies or hallucinations caused by the deprivation of basic bodily needs? 
The point is well taken. But it does not dig deep enough into the 
phenomenology of moral experience. A realist account of the stubbornness of 
moral facts moves back one further step and focuses on a purely receptive stage of 
the experience of value. This is the moment when the reality of ethics emerges 
under the vestige of a force field exerting a powerful influence on how life as a 
whole is lived and not as an object which may become the content of a that-clause. 
At this stage, the sense of resistance experienced by a moral agent comes down to 
the impossibility of reducing the contrast between the axiological polarities to the 
depthless and toothless alternative between the “I like it” and the “I don’t like it.” 
The sense of moral reality – the sense, that is, which is re-activated every time we 
utter a moral judgment or feel a moral sentiment – is all there. It adds up to the 
sense that there is no way out, that, no matter how hard we try, we cannot fill the 
gap dividing, for example, making or suffering an injustice or acting bravely and 
behaving cowardly. This is all we can get. The issue of the truth claims of specific 
moral evaluations or judgments is placed at another stage in thematising the 
moral phenomenon. 
More concretely, this special sense of reality is the main resource at our 
disposal to comprehend the repulse felt by many when confronted with standard 
forms of moral nihilism or cynicism. A typical example of this stance towards life 
is the sovereign indifference with which Stalin regarded the victims of his crimes: 
“Who’s going to remember all this riff-raff in ten or twenty years’ time? No one … 
Who remembers now the names of the boyars Ivan the terrible got rid of? No one. 
… In the end they all got what they deserved.”25 Once faced with such examples of 
total estrangement from the ethical substance of life, the proper response is not 
concocting an impeccable argument to show why we should or cannot but be 
moral, but dusting off our original experience as moral agents (which is 
encapsulated logically also in the so-called Hume’s law) that allows us to consider 
effortlessly such displays of insensitivity as a form of immorality rather than as 
the practical translation of a contestable metaethics (let’s say, an error theory).26 In 
this sense, the contact with the moral reality (understood as a kind of gradient 
 
25 Quoted in J. Glover, Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, Yale University 
Press, New Haven (CT), 2000, p. 256. 
26 On this see C. Taylor, “McDowell on Value and Knowledge,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 
199, 2000, pp. 242-249, especially pp. 244-245. 
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vector field) can be seen as the ethical life’s Urphänomen, in which the agent is 
aware at a pre-thematic level of the influence exerted on her agency by a realm of 
norms and values irreducible to the superficial and non-compelling alternative: “I 
like it/I don’t like it.” 
To sum up, the sense of moral reality can be described in terms of the pre- or 
proto-conceptual encounter with practical normativity as a fact of human 
existence. Put otherwise, making contact with the space of moral reasons means 
entering a realm of life within which there is ample room for a robust engaged 
exploration, susceptible of a (non-linear) progress under the guise of an oriented, 
yet non-cumulative, learning process. Here, a constant reconfiguration of the 
tables of duties, values and of the repertoire of moral emotions available to agents 
can be reasonably expected, as a rule and not as an exception. 
5. MORAL AGENTS IN A DARWINIAN WORLD 
As is broadly known, the weight of the vocabulary, the style of reasoning and 
the agenda of issues that, due to a convention rarely challenged, are grouped 
under the name of neo-Darwinism, has grown exponentially in the philosophical 
debate since the 1980s. This is partly the result of the explanatory power of what 
Dennett famously dubbed “Darwin’s dangerous idea,”27 partly a contingent 
consequence of Darwinian evolutionism’s being the only Weltanschauung left on 
the field in the West after the demise of Twentieth-century secular ideologies. It is 
this kind of common sense that enabled Sharon Street to speak outright of a 
“Darwinian” dilemma for realist theories of value in an influential article and to 
suggest a perfect equivalence between her selective reception of Darwin’s theory 
and “science” as such.28 
So I cannot bring my argument to a close without asking whether the quietist 
account of morality advocated above is compatible with a Darwinian view of the 
 
27 D. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Simon & 
Schuster, New York, 1995. 
28 See S. Street, A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, p. 154. For a full-fledged 
analysis of Darwin’s philosophical legacy see my Un’idea di umanità. Etica e natura dopo Darwin, 
EDB, Bologna, 2007. I argued for a “liberal” interpretation of Darwin’s thought in a review of P.S. 
Davis’s book Subjects of the World: Darwin’s Rhetoric and the Study of Agency in Nature, 
published on Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 10 October 2009 (available at: 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24194-subjects-of-the-world-darwin-s-rhetoric-and-the-study-of-agency-in-
nature/). 
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descent of man from other animal species, in whose lives it seems reasonable to 
assume that a robust exploration of the reality of ethics played no role whatsoever. 
The question is essentially how the emergence of a meaningful – although it is 
hard to say how much meaningful – novelty in the natural history of our planet 
can be explained in the light of the different time-frames within which human 
moral skills, on the one hand, and our reproductive fitness, on the other hand, 
made a difference. Do we perhaps kid ourselves when we emphasize the biological 
role played in human evolution by the access to a space of reasons? Couldn’t it be 
a negligible “spandrel” in the immemorial history of life on earth?29 
These are challenging questions. They are especially difficult, inter alia, 
because we would need to oversee not just the past, but also the future evolution 
of biological organisms in order to answer them on an informed basis. Although 
many biologists are persuaded that there have been cases of (relative) acceleration 
of the process of diversification of living things in the past (think only of the so-
called “Cambrian explosion”), there is no sufficient information available and, 
above all, no shared purely quantitative criteria to end the dispute to the 
satisfaction of all the contenders. Even the supposed “uniqueness” of the human 
species is regarded with varying degrees of scepticism depending on how people 
employ the category of biological “success” (which, as Darwin liked to point out, 
is a concept that should always be handled with care). The metaphor of the 
“struggle for existence”, on the other hand, is precisely that: a metaphor. There 
are, after all, many aspects in the appearance and behaviour of several animal 
species that can be traced back to a logic, so to speak, of “suasion” and ingenuity 
rather than brute force. This is the case, for example, of sexual selection based on 
cunning or “charm” (which, according to Darwin, is at the origin of the aesthetic 
sense in species in which the female exerts a choice) or the various forms of 
cooperation and non-violent competition between species. There are, 
furthermore, intraspecific relationship styles such as caregiving and play that, 
while not escaping in toto the selective pressure of reproductive fitness, open up 
spaces for individual action and creativity where freedom and agency matter 
more than the mechanical and impersonal pressure of natural selection.30 
 
29 On the metonymical use of “spandrels” in arguing against panadaptationism, see S.J. Gould, 
R.C. Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the 
Adaptationist Programme,” Proc. Roy. Soc. London. B 205, 1161, 1979, pp. 581–598. 
30 On sexual selection see C. Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (or. 
ed. 1871), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 2004, pt. II and III; on parental care see S.B. Hrdy, Mothers 
and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding, Harvard University Press, 
101       Realism without Objectivity 
 
 
 
While there is no doubt that, during evolution’s long march, natural selection 
played a crucial role in checking the adaptive value of the enabling conditions 
(agency, consciousness, emotions, semantic memory, recognition capacities, etc.) 
that made possible the moral experience in humans, I do not see how this widely 
supported evidence prevents us from seeing the emergence of a new species (or of 
any other taxa employed in modern biological classification) also as an 
opportunity to explore hitherto unknown corners of reality. It is at least prima 
facie plausible, therefore, to consider this form of spontaneity as a variety of 
situated freedom which results in the discovery (or re-discovery) of aspects or 
“isles” of reality, rather than conceptualizing it as an emerging capacity to 
construct portions of artificial life that are then superimposed onto the only 
coherent and self-sufficient reality worthy of the name. The latter being the inert 
and always self-identical (apart from the distribution of its parts in space) matter 
in motion within which the only source of change lies in the causal power of 
natural forces. Such a conception of reality, in fact, is no less postulatory than that 
which depends on a (far from unreasonable) trust in our ability to respond 
reliably to the (actual) affordances of our intentional environment.31 
To offer an example familiar to the readers of this article: how can the 
existence of lively discussions be explained? What is, in other words, the most 
plausible explanation of the fact that a significant number of members of the 
human species invest a great deal of psychological and intellectual energies with 
the intent to prevail in an exchange of arguments, i.e. to be recognized as right 
 
Cambridge (MA), 2009; on animal play see G.M. Burghardt, The Genesis of Animal Play: Testing 
the Limits, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 2005. 
31 On the “materialist exclusion” see C. Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the 
Human Linguistic Capacity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2016, pp. 204-211. For 
my part, I would extend the closing remark also to the phenomenon that, in the aftermath of the 
Darwinian Revolution, was often regarded (for understandable historical reasons) as the 
quintessence of human mind’s projectivism: religious belief. Even if we were to agree on a moot 
definition of the believer’s mindset as the psychological inclination to think that “there is more 
than meets the eye,” it is hard to understand why we should be satisfied with the idea that this bent 
rests only on a subjective disposition, passed through the sieve of natural selection. Why not 
consider it, instead, as a reasonable response to the cognitive underdetermination ingrained in the 
experience of beings who are endowed with the ability to explore their surrounding environment 
and an insatiable curiosity which is non-saturable, at least at the level of mind-frames? In this sense, 
I see Weber’s metaphor of “religiöse Unmusikalität” as more suitable to characterize a detached 
stance toward the question of the ultimate meaning of human existence, which he regarded as a 
topic more suited for “prophets” than for “professors” (with the predictable exception, incidentally, 
for those who helped to set up the rule). 
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about the matter? As far as I can see, there are three alternative interpretations at 
hand here. (1) It may be that the investment of energy has a direct adaptive value 
(which seems very difficult to prove in this case). (2) Or it may be that the 
investment has no direct, but only indirect adaptive value, to the extent that it is 
one of the many embodiments of the human impulse to dominate, which, taken 
individually, are indifferent with respect to their deeper motivation. (This account 
is close to the theoretical attitude which in philosophy usually goes under the 
name of “psychologism”). (3) Finally, it may be that the investment in an 
intangible goal is so intense because the action in which it is embedded does 
make contact with reality.  In other words, we might be facing here a gratuitous, 
playful pursuit, whose satisfaction is not merely psychological. It is more like a 
challenge that you can win or lose objectively (just like a football or basketball 
game), and in which the main gratification comes from the fact that, while reality 
counters the effort, it can also yield to it, certifying the won challenge and the 
success of the endeavour. 
If the claim that things like moral scruples (a variety of intelligence different 
from cunning) or romantic love (a form of personal care different from the mating 
drive) are mere epiphenomena of the only true reality – that is, a superficial 
veneer on a substance consisting of adaptive behavioural habits – does not sound 
sufficiently convincing, one can consider the hypothesis that the survival of non-
directly-adaptive abilities may depend on the fact that the latter are strengthened 
from the outside by their responsiveness to a reality that is partially independent 
of their psychological manifestations. 
There is nothing in Darwin’s outlook that is meant to stop us from articulating 
the insight that, in the course of biological evolution, opportunities for innovative 
forms of exploration of the surrounding environment have emerged and continue 
to emerge. They can be seen as life’s makeshift way to uncover what is hidden in 
the folds of reality. If we agree that the concept of reality still has a role to play in 
our efforts to understand ourselves and the world around us, we must be aware of 
how crucial to this process is the correct interpretation of the metaphor of the 
agent’s “grip on reality.” What is certain, however, is that the answer to this riddle 
is unaffected by the Darwinian explanation of the manifest diversity and 
underlying unity of the biosphere. We cannot expect the solution of so vexed 
philosophical issues to come from evolutionary biology or, let alone, from the 
antonym of armchair science, viz. (tacit) laboratory philosophy. The hospitality of 
our ontological repertoires is the key. My hunch is that this varies in proportion to 
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the importance we ascribe to our contact with the world and, hence, to what I 
have called here our basic sense of reality. 
To sum up: to what extent can the metaethical position articulated in this 
paper be regarded as quietist? My claim, in a nutshell, is that it is quietist so long 
as it has the potential to exorcise the anxieties arising from thinking that an 
alleged Darwinian explanation of human evolution is bound to be a major 
obstacle to embracing a variety of moral realism that has at least the merit of 
making the moral subject not feel like an alien in the natural world as it has been 
imagined since the Scientific Revolution. 
